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On the Meritocratic Allocation of 
Higher Education
Zachary Bleemer
Access to higher education is a key determinant of 
lifetime earnings in the United States. Since the 1960s, 
selective public universities have admitted students mostly 
on the basis of standardized test scores and other measures 
of academic preparation, on the theory that highly prepared 
students can best take advantage of universities’ rigorous 
curricula. I employ quasi-experimental and structural 
research designs to investigate the efficiency and economic 
mobility ramifications of these “meritocratic” admissions 
policies. This dissertation presents a collage of evidence 
from three educational allocation policies suggesting that the 
reallocation of selective higher education to disadvantaged 
students with relatively poorer measured academic 
preparation can promote both economic mobility and 
allocative efficiency, with those students’ net education and 
wage gains exceeding their crowded-out peers’ net losses. 
These efficiency findings undermine the primary justification 
for the 1960s implementation of meritocratic admissions 
policies at public institutions.
Essay 1
Affirmative Action, Mismatch, and Economic 
Mobility after Prop 209
Educational attainment, income, wealth, and economic 
mobility exhibit racial disparities in the United States. Access 
to selective universities is a key determinant of economic 
success and intergenerational mobility (Chetty et al. 2020a). 
As a result, many selective universities provide admissions 
advantages to applicants from disadvantaged racial and 
ethnic groups. Proponents of affirmative action argue 
that it offsets applicant qualification gaps that result from 
systemically unequal educational opportunities (Johnson 
2019). Detractors argue that affirmative action limits 
opportunity for Asian and white applicants and may have 
unintended consequences for targeted students. This study 
examines three questions at the basis of this disagreement. 
First, which students are targeted by affirmative action, and 
to what degree does affirmative action impact where those 
students go to college? Second, what are the short- and long-
run effects of enrolling at a more-selective university because 
of affirmative action? Finally, how are the net benefits and 
costs of affirmative action distributed across Asian, Black, 
Hispanic, and white university applicants?
Prior scholarship has arrived at conflicting conclusions 
about the value of enrolling at a more-selective university 
because of access-oriented admissions policies like 
affirmative action. On the one hand, several studies have 
shown that applicants with test scores and grades at selective 
universities’ minimum admissions thresholds are benefited 
by admission.1 Studies of affirmative action, however, 
have uncovered mixed evidence on student outcomes 
(Arcidiacono and Lovenheim 2016), with some finding 
support for the so-called mismatch hypothesis: that the 
lower-testing applicants targeted by affirmative action would 
benefit from enrolling at less-selective universities, where 
they better “match” their peers’ academic qualifications.
This study combines longitudinal administrative data 
with a difference-in-difference research design to estimate 
the impact of affirmative action on students’ college quality, 
course performance, choice of major, degree attainment, 
and wages over the subsequent 15 years. I construct a 
novel database of all 1994–2002 freshman applicants to the 
University of California (UC) system, which comprises all 
public research universities in the state and individually links 
each applicant to nationwide university records and annual 
California wages. I then compare the outcomes of Black 
and Hispanic UC applicants with those of academically 
comparable white and Asian applicants before and after 
California’s Proposition 209, which ended affirmative action 
at UC in 1998. I also link the applicant data to institutional 
value-added statistics to measure Prop 209’s effect on 
applicants’ university quality; to California high school 
records to examine Prop 209’s effect on UC application-
sending; and to five UC campuses’ student transcripts to 
estimate Prop 209’s impact on performance and persistence 
in demanding courses. Finally, I employ a regression 
discontinuity design to identify the value of being admitted 
to a selective public university for the on-the-margin white 
and Asian students likely to obtain greater university access 
after Prop 209.
I begin by documenting Prop 209’s impact on admissions 
at UC’s eight undergraduate campuses. Prop 209 curbed 
the large admissions advantages—some over 50 percentage 
points—provided by affirmative action to underrepresented 
minority (URM) UC applicants.2 As a result, UC’s URM 
applicants cascaded into less-selective colleges and 
universities: those with a high “UC Academic Index” (AI, 
a weighted average of high school grades and test scores) 
tended to flow from more-selective UC campuses to less-
selective campuses and private universities, while those 
with lower  s mostly flowed to less-selective public colleges 
and universities. Overall, Prop 209 resulted in a net outflow 
of lower-income students from highly selective public 
universities.
How did less-selective enrollment affect URM UC 
applicants? I estimate the average effect of Prop 209 using 
a difference-in-difference design over the population of 
UC applicants. Each model estimates how URM applicant 
outcomes change after 1997 (the last year of affirmative 
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action) relative to changes among non-URM applicants, with 
the second difference absorbing ethnicity-neutral enrollment 
trends in the 1990s.3 High school fixed effects and AI 
covariates absorb spurious variation and observable selection 
bias into UC application.4 I also estimate effect heterogeneity 
by URM AI quartile and by URM ethnicity. Implementing 
this model, I show that Prop 209 led URM UC applicants to 
enroll at relatively lower-quality colleges and universities 
on average, measured both by traditional metrics like 
graduation rate and by institutional value-added.5 In contrast 
with the predictions of the mismatch hypothesis, URM UC 
applicants’ average educational outcomes deteriorated after 
Prop 209: Bachelor’s degree attainment declined by 4.3 
percentage points among URM applicants in the bottom AI 
quartile, and overall STEM and graduate degree attainment 
declined by 1.0 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively. 
Following these applicants into the labor market, I find that 
Prop 209 caused URM UC applicants to earn 5 percent lower 
average annual wages between ages 24 and 34, with larger 
proportional effects for lower-AI applicants.6 The observed 
wage effects are driven by Hispanic applicants; despite 
parallel enrollment and degree attainment outcomes, I find 
no evidence of average wage deterioration among Black UC 
applicants after Prop 209.7
These estimated effects are averaged across every URM 
UC applicant, many of whose enrollments were likely 
unchanged by the affirmative action ban. This implies that 
treatment effects for directly impacted applicants were likely 
much larger. Given the magnitude of UC’s applicant pool, 
these estimates imply that Prop 209 caused an aggregate 
decline in the number of URM Californians in their early 
30s with 2014 wages over $100,000 by at least 3 percent. 
American Community Survey data confirm a 2010s pattern 
of relative wage deterioration among high-earning early-
career URM Californians.
The primary threat to this baseline research design is the 
possibility of sample selection bias arising from differential 
selection into UC application after Prop 209.8 Estimating a 
difference-in-difference model of the proportion of California 
public high school students who applied to UC by ethnicity 
and AI bin, I find that UC annually received about 250 fewer 
Black and 900 fewer Hispanic applications after Prop 209, 
almost 80 percent of whom would likely have been admitted 
to at least one UC campus.9 While application deterrence 
could generate bias, I find that the baseline estimates 
are insensitive to a school-ethnicity-AI control function 
(following Card and Rothstein 2007) and other highly 
detailed socioeconomic and academic covariates.10
The baseline research design does not separately identify 
the impact of Prop 209 on non-URM applicants’ outcomes. 
Instead, I exploit a large discontinuity non-URM admissions 
at UC Berkeley before Prop 209 to study the return to 
selective university access for on-the-margin non-URM 
applicants, many of whom may have been admitted if not 
for affirmative action. Employing a regression discontinuity 
design, I find that students just below Berkeley’s admissions 
threshold nevertheless ended up with similar educational and 
labor market outcomes after enrolling at other universities, 
though the confidence intervals cannot rule out positive 
treatment effects. This suggests that the value of selective 
public university access for on-the-margin non-URM 
students was small.
Next, I turn to mechanisms explaining URM UC 
applicants’ deteriorated educational outcomes after Prop 209. 
Several prior studies have suggested that URM students’ 
STEM course performance and persistence would improve 
absent affirmative action, which likely would have led to 
the opposite of Prop 209’s effect on STEM attainment.11 
However, while URM UC students earned lower grades 
and were less likely to persist along introductory STEM 
course sequences than their non-URM peers before Prop 
209, these gaps are largely explained by students’ prior 
academic opportunities and preparation, not their enrollment 
institution. Prop 209 has no observable effect on students’ 
STEM course performance and persistence, which do not 
appear to contribute to the effects of Prop 209 on students’ 
educational and wage outcomes.
I conclude with a discussion of the efficiency of 
affirmative action. Two sets of evidence favor its allocative 
efficiency, which in this case requires (to a first-order 
approximation) that the benefit of more-selective university 
enrollment is greater for affirmative action’s URM enrollees 
than for the non-URM students who would have enrolled 
in their place.12 First, the estimated return to UC Berkeley 
and Davis admission for on-the-margin non-URM students 
appears small, while URM applicants’ estimated wage 
return to more-selective enrollment before Prop 209 is 
large.13 Second, the latter return exceeds the average 
observed change in institutional value-added experienced by 
URM UC applicants, suggesting that the URM applicants 
impacted by Prop 209 had received above-average returns 
to more-selective university enrollment (as in Dale and 
Krueger 2014; Bleemer 2018).14 This evidence suggests that 
affirmative action both promotes socioeconomic mobility 
among URM youths and improves higher education’s 
allocative efficiency.
This study makes three main contributions. First, while 
previous studies have analyzed the intermediate effects 
of universities’ affirmative action policies—sometimes 
coming to conflicting conclusions—they share common 
limitations. Several studies have exploited cross-state policy 
variation to estimate the educational impact of banning 
affirmative action, but out-of-state enrollment confounds 
identification of the policies’ effects on impacted students.15 
Others estimate models of applicant and university 
behavior to predict how affirmative action could impact 
student enrollment and outcomes, but do not validate these 
predictions using actual policy variation.16 A third set of 
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studies have analyzed administrative university data from 
before and after Prop 209, but limits on available covariates 
and outcomes have challenged attempts to separately identify 
the effect of affirmative action from compositional changes 
among UC’s applicants and students.17 This study augments 
previous research by implementing a quasi-experimental 
research design spanning all U.S. universities that identifies 
the individual-level effects of affirmative action, and by 
analyzing new intermediate outcomes like university “value-
added,” STEM performance and persistence, and graduate 
degree completion.
Second, this is the first study to causally link changes 
in university quality to wage outcomes in the context of 
affirmative action, bridging the affirmative action literature 
with a literature identifying heterogeneity in the return to 
higher education.18 Much of the affirmative action literature 
has focused on whether it leads URM applicants to earn 
lower average wages (Sowell 1972; Arcidiacono and 
Lovenheim 2016), but my findings are inconsistent with 
this mismatch hypothesis.19 On the other hand, while most 
studies of heterogeneous university return focus on a local 
margin (e.g., Hoekstra 2009; Zimmerman 2014), I estimate 
average returns to university quality across subsets of all 
URM UC applicants after an affirmative action ban. I also 
present regression discontinuity evidence highlighting the 
importance of applicants’ counterfactual enrollments and 
heterogeneity in estimating the return to selective university 
enrollment.
Finally, I provide the first direct evidence that affirmative 
action has first-order implications for intergenerational 
mobility and socioeconomic gaps by ethnicity. A growing 
literature examines the mechanisms explaining opportunity 
gaps for lower-income and URM youths and the efficacy 
of available policies to narrow those gaps (e.g., Jackson, 
Johnson, and Persico 2016; Chetty, Hendren, and Katz 
2016). I find little evidence that affirmative action narrowed 
the Black-white mobility gap, which has received particular 
attention (Dobbie and Fryer Jr. 2011; Billings, Deming, 
and Rockoff 2014; Chetty et al. 2020b; Derenoncourt and 
Montialoux 2021), but find that it improved Black students’ 
educational attainment and relatively increased (mostly 
lower-income) Hispanic youths’ wages.
Essay 2
Top Percent Policies and the Return to 
Postsecondary Selectivity
Since the 1960s, selective public universities in the United 
States have admitted students mostly using test scores and 
other measures of academic preparation.20 Many universities 
provide admissions advantages to certain disadvantaged 
applicants in order to rectify unequal K–12 learning 
opportunities and promote socioeconomic mobility, but 
these “access-oriented” admissions policies are controversial 
on efficiency grounds: students with lower test scores are 
generally thought to derive smaller (or no) benefits from 
more-elite education when compared to the students admitted 
by test-based meritocracy (Arcidiacono and Lovenheim 
2016). This study investigates two open questions about the 
allocation of public higher education in the United States. 
First, would lower-testing students benefit from selective 
university enrollment, and how would their return compare 
to that received by higher-testing students? Second, can 
available policies target lower-testing but high-value-add 
students, and how would implementing those policies shape 
universities’ socioeconomic composition? I answer these 
questions by studying an access-oriented admission policy 
implemented by UC between 2001 and 2011. Eligibility in 
the Local Context (ELC) was a “top percent” policy that 
guaranteed selective university admission to applicants 
whose grades ranked in the top four percent of their high 
school class.21 I construct a new UC applicant administrative 
dataset and use a regression discontinuity design to estimate 
ELC’s effect on barely eligible applicants’ likelihood of 
admission and enrollment at each UC campus. I then link 
each applicant to national education records and annual 
California wages and employ an instrumental variable 
strategy to estimate the medium-run effects of more-selective 
university enrollment for ELC participants. Building on 
these reduced-form findings, I next estimate and validate 
a structural model of university application, admission, 
and enrollment with an embedded top percent policy in 
order to simulate the net effects of top percent policies on 
universities’ enrollment composition. Finally, I extend both 
the quasi-experimental and structural research designs to 
investigate the relationship between students’ meritocratic 
standing and their return to enrolling at a more-selective 
university.
I show that the admissions advantages conferred by 
ELC eligibility caused over 12 percent of barely eligible 
applicants from less-competitive high schools to enroll at 
four selective UC campuses instead of enrolling at less-
selective public colleges. Instrumental variable estimates 
show that these barely eligible ELC “participants” became 
30 percentage points more likely to earn a college degree 
within five years—approximately matching the increase 
in graduation rates of the institutions they attended—and 
earned higher annual wages by as much as $25,000 between 
ages 25 and 27. ELC’s roughly 600 annual participants 
came from lower-income and more diverse families than 
the crowded-out students whom they replaced at UC, and 
model simulations show that a top percent policy providing 
equivalent admissions advantages to the top 9 percent of 
each high school’s graduates would meaningfully increase 
those UC campuses’ lower-income and underrepresented 
minority (URM) enrollment (by about 4 and 8 percent, 
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respectively).22 Complementing reduced-form and 
institutional value-added evidence showing that even very 
low-testing ELC-eligible applicants receive large and 
above-average wage treatment effects from more-selective 
enrollment, the essay concludes with evidence that the 
model-based prediction of each student’s meritocratic 
standing is weakly and negatively correlated with their 
estimated return to university selectivity.
I begin below by providing background on the 10-campus 
UC system and its 2001 Eligibility in the Local Context 
policy. I then describe the novel dataset used in this study, 
which includes far greater detail on 2001–2013 freshman 
UC applicants’ socioeconomic, geographic, and academic 
characteristics than any previously studied records. Each 
applicant is linked to the internally calculated “ELC GPA” 
used to determine their ELC eligibility as well as National 
Student Clearinghouse enrollment and degree records and 
annual California Employment Development Department 
wage records through 2019.
I next introduce the stacked regression discontinuity 
research design that I employ to study the reduced-form 
effects of ELC eligibility on applicant behavior and 
outcomes. I present evidence to support the design’s 
key identification assumption that applicants’ potential 
outcomes are smooth across their high schools’ ELC GPA 
eligibility thresholds. I then show that ELC eligibility did 
not substantially affect admissions decisions at UC’s most 
and least selective campuses, the former because they did 
not provide admissions advantages to eligible students and 
the latter because they were already admitting nearly all 
high-GPA applicants. However, the UC campuses at San 
Diego, Davis, Irvine, and Santa Barbara all provided large 
admissions advantages to ELC-eligible applicants: barely 
eligible applicants from the bottom half of California high 
schools (ranked by SAT scores) became 10–35 percentage 
points more likely to be admitted to each campus as a result 
of their ELC eligibility. Over 12 percent of those applicants 
switched into enrolling at one of the four “Absorbing” 
UC campuses instead of enrolling at a teaching-oriented 
California State University, a less-selective UC campus, or a 
local community college.
Because top graduates from more-competitive high 
schools had little need for ELC eligibility to gain UC 
admission, almost 90 percent of those barely eligible ELC 
participants were from the bottom half of California high 
schools by SAT. Two-thirds of participants came from 
families with below-median household incomes and about 
45 percent were URM. Barely eligible participants’ average 
SAT scores were at the 12th percentile of their Absorbing UC 
peers, altogether suggesting a negatively selected group of 
students.
Next, I turn to estimation of how ELC eligibility 
impacted near-threshold ELC participants’ educational and 
labor market outcomes. I show that ELC eligibility caused 
reduced-form increases in five-year degree attainment, seven-
year graduate school enrollment, and early-career annual 
wages. ELC-eligible applicants became somewhat less likely 
to earn degrees in STEM fields, but they became more likely 
to earn any college degree while simultaneously spending 
fewer years enrolled in college (as a result of reductions in 
time-to-degree). To identify each of the four Absorbing UC 
campuses’ treatment effects experienced by near-threshold 
ELC participants, I construct four instrumental variables 
by interacting the regression discontinuity design with 
applicants’ distance to each campus. I find that enrolling 
at any of the Absorbing UC campuses increased five-year 
degree attainment by 30–34 percentage points and graduate 
school enrollment by 22–47 percentage points. The estimated 
effects on wages are noisier: enrolling at UC Davis increased 
near-threshold participants’ annual early-career wages by 
about $25,000, but the positive wage effects at the other 
campuses are imprecisely estimated. Near-threshold ELC 
participants from the bottom quartile of high schools (who 
would have otherwise enrolled at institutions with 35 percent 
lower graduation rates on average) received benefits at 
least as large as those received by participants with better 
counterfactual enrollments, suggesting large returns to more-
selective enrollment, even for very disadvantaged applicants.
Having shown that more-selective university enrollment 
substantially benefits the low-testing students on the 
margin of ELC eligibility, I next turn to general equilibrium 
estimation of top percent policies’ net effects on universities’ 
student composition and average returns. I embed a top 
percent policy into a structural model of applicant and 
university decision-making adapted from Kapor (2020). 
The model flexibly characterizes students’ preferences over 
universities and models university admissions as maximizing 
the observed and latent academic caliber of their student 
bodies. I estimate the model parameters by simulated 
maximum likelihood, separately identifying admission and 
enrollment preferences by exploiting the ELC policy, its 
post-2011 cessation, and distance-to-campus instruments. 
The resulting parameters align with prior research and 
successfully replicate the reduced-form effects of ELC 
eligibility.
I employ the model to conduct a series of counterfactual 
exercises. I first simulate how ELC shifts Absorbing UC 
campuses’ enrollment composition by switching ELC’s 
admission advantages off (on) in 2010– 2011 (2012–2013), 
allowing each university’s regular admissions threshold 
to adjust in order to maintain its level of enrollment. This 
allows me to identify the students who are crowded out 
by ELC, a group otherwise inaccessible in my regression 
discontinuity analysis. Both strategies provide highly similar 
results: the 600 annual ELC participants had lower average 
family incomes by $20,000 and were 15 percentage points 
more likely to be URM than their crowded-out peers. I 
also simulate the effect of providing ELC’s admissions 
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advantages to the top 1, 2, and up to the top 9 percent of 
applicants from each California high school. The simulations 
show that top percent policies are indeed “access-oriented”: 
the 9 percent policy increases net lower-income and URM 
enrollment at Absorbing UC campuses each by about 350 
students, despite the crowded-out students being negatively 
selected relative to the average Absorbing UC student.
Finally, I further exploit the structural model to 
investigate the broader relationship between students’ 
meritocratic standing and their estimated return to more-
selective university enrollment. Abstracting from the ELC 
policy, I employ a selection-on-unobservables strategy 
(partially following Dale and Krueger [2002]) to show 
that the applicants’ latent “application merit”—or the 
preference index used by universities in admissions—is 
strongly correlated with applicants’ future educational 
and employment success, but not with their estimated 
return to university selectivity; if anything, the average 
return to selectivity is lower for higher-merit applicants. 
These estimates complement the reduced-form evidence 
that the return to university selectivity scales similarly 
for ELC participants with stronger or weaker measured 
academic preparation. They also complement additional 
evidence showing that the wage return to near-threshold 
ELC participants’ Absorbing UC campus enrollment 
equals or exceeds the average return to enrolling at those 
universities, estimating institutions’ average “value-added” 
following Chetty et al. (2020a). These findings suggest 
that the first-order net effect of top percent policies is to 
reallocate educational resources to high-GPA (and perhaps 
high noncognitive skill) disadvantaged applicants without 
efficiency loss.
This study makes three primary contributions. First, it 
provides the first estimates of the medium-run impact of 
selective university admission under an access-oriented 
admission policy.23 Expanding prior research that focused on 
the return to selective enrollment for students on the margin 
of universities’ test-based admissions thresholds (Hoekstra 
2009; Anelli 2019; Sekhri 2020), I find that a broad array of 
students would earn large medium-run returns from selective 
university access, including many students who currently 
enroll at states’ least-selective postsecondary institutions.24 
This evidence suggests that broadening selective research 
university access to many high school graduates with 
low socioeconomic status, as through low-cost access-
oriented admission policies, is an impactful and potentially 
efficient economic mobility lever available to university 
administrators and state policymakers. While this has been 
suggested in observational and macroeconomic models 
(e.g., Chetty et al. 2020a; Capelle 2019) and is assumed by 
studies focused on encouraging disadvantaged students’ 
more-selective enrollment (e.g., Hoxby and Turner 2013), 
it remains contentious in the literature on affirmative action 
(Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz 2016; Bleemer 2020a).
Second, this study provides evidence on the impact of 
a college admissions policy that admits students without 
regard to their standardized test scores (Black, Cortes, 
and Lincove 2016). Since at least 1960, when California 
enshrined standardized tests in its “Master Plan for Higher 
Education” to identify “applicants whose educational 
purposes are properly met by the college and whose abilities 
and training indicate probable success,” public universities 
have used evidence of tests’ “predictive validity” for college 
grades and retention to justify their rejection of lower-
testing applicants (Westrick et al. 2019; Rothstein 2004). 
I show that the benefits to more-selective enrollment are 
at least as large (and likely larger) for high-GPA students 
whose low SAT scores would typically have disqualified 
them from selective universities as they are for the higher-
SAT students currently admitted to those universities. 
Indeed, despite being negatively selected, near-threshold 
ELC participants’ 75 percent average graduation rate was 
roughly equal to the institutional average (77 percent). As 
many public universities rethink how their meritocratic 
admissions policies rank applicants (Saboe and Terrizzi 
2019), these findings show that targeting high-GPA low-SAT 
applicants could simultaneously broaden university access 
and increase institutions’ economic value-added. Finally, this 
study contributes to a nascent structural literature modeling 
students’ school application and enrollment decisions 
(Arcidiacono 2005; Epple, Romano, and Sieg 2006; Howell 
2010; Chade, Lewis, and Smith 2014; Walters 2018; Kapor 
2020), providing new detailed information about student and 
university preferences. The estimated model also provides 
novel estimates of the relative magnitude and compositional 
effects of top percent policies with different eligibility 
thresholds, facilitating straightforward comparison with other 
access-oriented university admissions policies (Long 2004).
Essay 3
Major Choice Restrictions and  
Student Stratification
Undergraduate major selection has long-run labor market 
implications: students earn higher postgraduate wages if they 
earn degrees in “high-return” professional degrees (Deming 
and Noray 2020; Bleemer and Mehta 2020b) or degrees 
in their preferred field of study (Kirkeboen, Leuven, and 
Mogstad 2016; Daly and Le Maire 2019). URM and lower-
income university students are underrepresented in many 
high-earning fields like computer science and economics, 
which likely exacerbates income inequality (Monarrez 
and Washington 2020). Meanwhile, many universities 
impose restrictions—like minimum GPA requirements 
and competitive internal applications—on which fields of 
study are available to enrolled students, with restrictions 
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particularly prevalent in those same high-demand fields. This 
study analyzes whether and how major restrictions contribute 
to the socioeconomic stratification of university students 
across fields of study.
Prior studies on major selection has largely focused 
on student preferences; a recent survey does not mention 
major restrictions in its discussion of the “supply side” 
of choosing a college major (Altonji, Arcidiacono, and 
Maurel 2016).25 However, major restrictions are widely 
implemented at selective public universities in the United 
States. Consider five of the highest-wage college majors 
at the 25 top-ranked U.S. public universities (according to 
U.S. News & World Report), shown in the chapter’s Table 
1. These universities enroll about 750,000 undergraduates, 
or half of all students at top-100 American universities (and 
7 percent of all American undergraduates).26 Half of these 
schools restrict their computer science majors—typically to 
students who earn high grades (minimum 2.5–3.75 GPAs) 
in introductory computer science courses—while 10 have 
restricted economics majors. Only two schools do not restrict 
their finance majors, and only Georgia Tech does not restrict 
mechanical engineering. Every university with a nursing 
school restricts entry to that major.27
This study analyzes the impact of major restrictions using 
a new dataset of demographic and course records for the over 
900,000 students who enrolled between 1975 and 2018 at 
four selective public universities: UC Berkeley, UC Davis, 
UC Santa Barbara, and UC Santa Cruz. It employs difference-
in-difference event study designs at the departmental and 
student level to estimate the effect of the 29 new major 
restrictions imposed during the period. It then examines a case 
study that compares students’ persistence by socioeconomic 
characteristics at a restricted and an unrestricted university.
We find that major restrictions lead to a 10–20 percent 
decline in the number of students declaring that major on 
average. URM students and students with poorer academic 
preparation are much more likely to exit restricted majors 
than their peers. Major restrictions impede major choice 
for students with absolute academic disadvantage, not 
comparative disadvantage in the field; the students who 
exit restricted majors earned similarly low first-quarter 
grades across all disciplines, not just in the restricted field. 
On average, restrictions cause female and URM students 
intending restricted majors to instead enroll in relatively 
lower- return fields of study. The case study shows that 
URM and lower-income students become less likely to earn 
degrees in a restricted field because of their lower average 
grades in introductory courses, which is explained in part 
by their lower SAT scores and more-limited prior access to 
related AP and IB high school courses. This evidence implies 
that major restrictions inefficiently limit student choice on 
the basis of students’ preenrollment educational opportunity 
and demographically stratify students across majors by 
average wages.
This study makes three main contributions. First, it 
contributes to an equity-oriented literature interested in 
socioeconomic stratification across (MacLeod and Urquiola 
2015; Chetty et al. 2020a; Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom 
2019a,b) and within (Schultz et al. 2011; Arcidiacono, 
Aucejo, and Hotz 2016; Mourifie, Henry, and Meango 2020; 
Brenoe and Zolitz 2020; Card and Payne 2021) universities, 
providing the first known evidence that a popular university 
policy magnifies stratification. Major restrictions likely have 
substantive implications for impacted students’ postgraduate 
outcomes: Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad (2016) show 
evidence of large postgraduate wage declines among 
students prohibited from earning degrees in their preferred 
discipline, and Bleemer and Mehta (2020b) show that falling 
just below an economics department’s GPA major restriction 
substantially decreases rejected students’ early-career 
wages.28
Second, this study documents an important determinant 
of student major selection that has been largely omitted from 
the large academic literature on major choice.29 While that 
literature has largely focused on the demand-side of major 
choice—particularly students’ preferences and subjective 
expectations (Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Spenner 2012; Zafar 
2013; Kinsler and Pavan 2015; Wiswall and Zafar 2015, 
2018)—this brief describes a widely implemented supply-
side policy that substantially limits many students’ access to 
high-average-wage majors.30
Finally, this study contributes to a literature immediately 
interested in the aggregate number of STEM degrees 
awarded by American universities (Ehrenberg 2010; 
National Academies 2007; Wang 2013; Sjoquist and 
Winters 2015a,b; Castleman, Long, and Mabel 2018). Half 
of the major restrictions imposed by the four universities 
discussed below were imposed in STEM fields, and major 
restrictions generally impose a previously unreported ceiling 
on STEM major growth in many fields at many universities, 
particularly discouraging URM and less-relatively-prepared 
students from earning high-demand STEM majors.
Essay 4
Will Studying Economics Make You Rich? 
A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of the 
Returns to College Major
Forty-year-old U.S. workers with undergraduate degrees 
in economics earned median wages of $90,000 in 2018. 
By comparison, those who had majored in other social 
sciences earned median wages of $65,000, and college 
graduates with any major other than economics earned 
$66,000. Relative to workers with lower-wage majors, 
the observational premiums earned by workers with high-
wage majors like engineering, nursing, and economics are 
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similar in size to the wage gap between college graduates 
and nongraduates (Altonji, Blom, and Meghir 2012). 
These gaps have motivated a large literature examining 
the determinants of students’ major choices (Zafar 2013; 
Stange 2015; Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz 2016; Wiswall 
and Zafar 2018; Patnaik et al. 2020). However, average 
wage differences between majors do not necessarily reflect 
the causal effect of choosing one major over another. This 
study directly analyzes the treatment effects of earning an 
undergraduate degree in the popular high-earning field of 
economics.
Estimating the causal effects of earning specific college 
majors is challenged by students’ nonrandom assortment 
across majors: most students self-select their college major, 
and many universities and departments use admissions and 
grade requirements to restrict entry into certain majors. 
As a result, observational wage differences across majors 
may reflect selection bias. We overcome this challenge 
by using a regression discontinuity design that exploits a 
fuzzy discontinuity in economics major access at a large 
moderately selective public university (Angrist and Lavy 
1999).31 We implement this design to estimate the effect of 
studying economics on students’ early-career earnings and 
industries, as well as how the major’s effect on earnings 
is mediated by changes in students’ other educational 
outcomes, career preferences, and early-career industries. 
We then characterize and estimate the biases that arise when 
using observational average wage differences between 
economics and other majors as a proxy for the effect of 
majoring in economics.
The specific case we analyze is the department of 
economics at UC Santa Cruz. UCSC Economics imposed a 
GPA restriction policy in 2008: students with a grade point 
average below 2.8 in Economics 1 and 2 were generally 
prevented from declaring an economics major. Students 
who just met the GPA threshold were 36 percentage points 
more likely to declare the economics major than those who 
just failed to meet it. Most of these students would have 
otherwise earned degrees in other social sciences. Students 
just above the threshold who majored in economics were 
surprisingly representative of all UCSC economics majors 
on observables; for example, their average SAT scores was at 
the 41st percentile of economics majors.
Comparing the major choices and average wages of 
above- and below-threshold students shows that majoring 
in economics caused a $22,000 (46 percent) increase in 
the annual early-career wages of barely above-threshold 
students. It did so without otherwise impacting their 
educational investment—as measured by course-adjusted 
average grades and weekly hours spent studying—or 
outcomes like degree attainment and graduate school 
enrollment. The effect is nearly identical for male and female 
students, may be larger for underrepresented minority 
students, and appears to grow as workers age (between ages 
23 and 28). About half of the wage effect can be explained by 
the effect of majoring in economics on students’ industry of 
employment: relative to students who did not qualify for the 
major, economics majors became more interested in business 
and finance careers and were more likely to find employment 
in higher-wage economics-related industries like finance, 
insurance, and real estate and accounting. A decomposition 
of this wage effect shows that the return to majoring in 
economics would likely have been above-average for the 
near-threshold students rejected from the economics major, 
once again suggesting the potential for efficiency and 
economic mobility gains in implementing a less “merit”-
oriented allocation policy.
This is one of the first studies to employ a quasi-
experimental research design to identify labor market returns 
to college major choice in the United States.32 A small 
number of previous studies have analyzed major-specific 
returns in other countries by exploiting centralized field-
specific enrollment assignment rules (Kirkeboen, Leuven, 
and Mogstad 2016; Hastings, Nielsen, and Zimmerman 
2018; Daly and Le Maire 2019). However, the external 
validity of those estimates in the United States may be 
limited: American universities offer a broader core liberal 
arts curriculum, permit students to choose their majors years 
after their initial enrollment, and provide students with more 
discretion over their courses, all of which could narrow field-
specific returns. A large literature has employed selection-
on-observables methods and structural estimation to identify 
major-specific returns (James et al. 1989; Rumberger and 
Thomas 1993; Black, Sanders, and Taylor 2003; Arcidiacono 
2004; Hamermesh and Donald 2008), generally arguing that 
selection bias explains a substantial portion of U.S. wage 
variation across majors.
This study’s reduced-form regression discontinuity design 
provides unusually transparent evidence of postsecondary 
education’s heterogeneous and persistent role in shaping 
students’ labor market outcomes. Our estimated early-career 
wage return to economics rivals the baseline return to a 
college degree, implying that major choice is a first-order 
heterogeneity component in the return to higher education. 
A related literature has used quasi-experimental research 
designs to highlight university selectivity as another 
important dimension of heterogeneous university treatment 
effects (Hoekstra 2009; Zimmerman 2014; Cohodes and 
Goodman 2014; Bleemer 2018, 2020a). However, even 
students who are quasi-randomly switched to enrolling at 
universities with 25 percentage points higher graduation 
rates—a large increase in selectivity—receive an early-career 
wage return 30 percent lower than the return to majoring in 
economics at UCSC (Bleemer 2018). These findings imply 
that widespread but understudied university policies that 
shape student major choice—like GPA restrictions, variable 
tuition, and grade inflation—have important long-run 
efficiency and social mobility ramifications.
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Notes
 1. See Hoekstra (2009); Zimmerman (2014); Anelli (2019); 
Kozakowski (2019); Sekhri (2020); Smith, Goodman, and 
Hurwitz (2020). Few quasi-experimental studies examine 
selective universities’ value to applicants with poorer measured 
academic qualifications, but Cohodes and Goodman (2014) and 
Bleemer (2018) provide evidence of their return to selectivity 
in other contexts.
 2. URM includes African American (Black), Chicano and Latino 
(Hispanic), and Native American students.
 3. Non-URM applicants may not represent a traditional 
unimpacted comparison group, since some likely “crowded 
into” more-selective universities after Prop 209. I return to 
the question of non-URM applicant outcomes in the essay, but 
the fact that non-URM applicants outnumber URM applicants 
by more than four-to-one in the applicant pool dilutes any 
“crowd-in” effects, implying that at least 80 percent of the 
observed differences are likely driven by changes in URM 
applicant outcomes.
 4. AI and ethnicity explained 40–70 percent of admissions 
variation at most UC campuses in the mid-1990s. Cortes (2010) 
uses a similar design to compare student outcomes between 
Texas’s affirmative action and Top Ten policies.
 5. I estimate institutional value-added by regressing degree 
attainment and wages on UC applicants’ first enrollment 
institution, conditioning on observables following either 
Mountjoy and Hickman (2020) or Chetty et al. (2020a).
 6. These changes cannot be explained by California labor market 
entry or exit: 69 percent of UC applicants had positive annual 
CA wages between ages 24 and 34, and URM applicants’ 
employment remained unchanged overall and in each AI 
quartile.
 7. This finding is in line with Chetty et al.’s (2020b) argument that 
educational differences cannot explain the Black-white wage 
gap in the United States, although that study does not discuss 
the role of university selectivity.
 8. Other potential threats—including nonreported applicant 
ethnicity, imperfect National Student Clearinghouse degree 
reporting, and some campuses’ preemptive implementation of 
Prop 209—are discussed in the essay.
 9. Card and Krueger (2005) reach a different conclusion when 
they proxy university applications with SAT “score sends” 
from the College Board. My analysis uses actual university 
applications.
 10. In particular, I perform a Monte Carlo exercise randomly 
selecting sets of detailed covariates like family income, 
parental occupation and education, and additional measures of 
academic preparation for model inclusion. While the baseline 
estimates are insensitive to additional covariates, bias on 
orthogonal unobserved characteristics could remain.
 11. See Loury and Garman (1993); Holzer and Neumark (2000); 
Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz (2016).
 12. I show that relative enrollment at high- and low-value-add 
California universities was unchanged by Prop 209.
 13. Black, Denning, and Rothstein (2020) also provide evidence 
against large returns to more-selective university enrollment 
for the students who were “crowded out” of selective Texas 
universities by Texas Top Ten.
 14. Selection bias in the estimated value-added statistics will tend 
to exaggerate differences across institutions, implying that Prop 
209’s estimated effect on institutional value-added is likely 
biased upward.
15. See Backes (2012); Hinrichs (2012, 2014); Blume and Long 
(2014); Hill (2017); Long and Bateman (2020).
16. See Alon and Tienda (2005); Howell (2010); Arcidiacono, 
Aucejo, and Hotz (2016); Kapor (2020).
17. See Antonovics and Backes (2013, 2014); Arcidiacono et al. 
(2014); Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz (2016). Bagde, Epple, 
and Taylor (2016) and Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan 
(2010) show that Indian universities’ caste-based affirmative 
action improves targeted students’ grades and wage outcomes, 
respectively.
18. See, e.g., Dale and Krueger (2002) and Arcidiacono 
(2004). Bowen and Bok (1998) and Arcidiacono (2005) use 
selection-on- observables and a structural model, respectively, 
to identify the effect of affirmative action on URM students’ 
wages. Zimmerman (2019) shows that the largest returns to 
elite Chilean university enrollment accrue only to high-income 
students.
19. Two recent studies of affirmative action “mismatch” also 
analyze UC in the 1990s (Arcidiacono et al. 2014; Arcidiacono, 
Aucejo, and Hotz 2016). Bleemer (2020b) discusses the 
limitations of that previous research in the specific context of 
Prop 209 and reconciles his analysis with my baseline findings. 
Dillon and Smith (2020) and Barrow, Sartain, and de la Torre 
(2020) find evidence of test- and income-based “mismatch” at 
U.S. undergraduate institutions and elite Chicago public high 
schools, respectively. 
20. Until surging demand for postsecondary education made 
open access impossible in the late 1950s, public universities 
provided low-cost education to any student who satisfactorily 
completed high school (Douglass 2007; Goldin and Katz 2008).
21. Top percent policies have been implemented in Texas, Florida, 
and Georgia, and have been considered in several other states. 
22. As I discuss below, ELC was indeed “expanded” in 2012 to the 
top 9 percent of applicants from each high school, but I show 
that every selective UC campus ceased providing admissions 
advantages to ELC-eligible students, de facto ending the 
policy’s effects on the composition of UC enrollment.
23. Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010) estimate a positive 
wage return to caste-based affirmative action programs at 
engineering colleges in India. Subsequent to this study, 
Bleemer (2020a) and Black, Denning, and Rothstein (2020) 
find similar reduced-form returns to a race-based affirmative 
action policy in California and a top percent policy in Texas, 
but neither paper is amenable to an instrumental variable 
strategy that identifies effects for policy compliers.
24. Zimmerman (2014) and Smith, Goodman, and Hurwitz (2020) 
show positive returns to less- or nonselective university 
enrollment for students at those institutions’ admissions 
thresholds. Dale and Krueger (2002, 2014) show evidence of 
positive returns for disadvantaged students enrolling at highly 
selective institutions instead of other selective institutions, 
and Cohodes and Goodman (2014) show that more-selective 
enrollment improves students’ degree attainment.
25. Stange (2015), Andrews and Stange (2019), and Denning and 
Turley (2017) discuss major-specific price discrimination 
and payments, which are important—though presently less-
common—supply-side contributors to major choice.
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26. Wage statistics as reported by Altonji, Blom, and Meghir (2012).
27. Grade restrictions of C+ (2.3) or below are excluded, as they 
are generally put in place to prevent students who cannot pass 
upper-division courses from beginning technical majors, not to 
manage demand among capable students.
28. Griffith (2010) shows that students with lower measured 
preparedness are less likely to earn STEM majors, while 
Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz (2016) and Bleemer (2020a) 
come to different conclusions about whether enrollment at 
more-selective universities under affirmative action decreases 
URM students’ STEM degree attainment.
29. See Altonji, Blom, and Meghir (2012) and Altonji, Arcidiacono, 
and Maurel (2016) for surveys.
30. This study also documents a source of selection bias in the 
estimation of major-specific returns (Arcidiacono 2004).
31. This design was suggested by both Altonji, Blom, and Meghir 
(2012) and Altonji, Arcidiacono, and Maurel (2016).
32. The only known quasi-experimental study to previously 
identify heterogeneous returns by college major in the United 
States is Andrews, Imberman, and Lovenheim (2017), who 
analyze the return to majoring in business by exploiting a GPA 
threshold policy at several University of Texas campuses. Their 
suggestive finding of a large wage return to business majors 
closely parallels our own estimates with regard to economics.
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